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Human adults tend to avoid risk. In behavioral economic studies, risk aversion is mani-
fest as a preference for sure gains over uncertain gains. However, children tend to be less
averse to risk than adults. Given that many of the brain regions supporting decision-making
under risk do not reach maturity until late adolescence or beyond it is possible that mature
risk-averse behavior may emerge from the development of decision-making circuitry. To
explore this hypothesis, we tested 5- to 8-year-old children, 14- to 16-year-old adolescents,
and young adults in a risky-decision task during functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) data acquisition. To our knowledge, this is the youngest sample of children in an
fMRIdecision-makingtask.Wefoundanumberofdecision-relatedbrainregionstoincrease
in activation with age during decision-making, including areas associated with contextual
memory retrieval and the incorporation of prior outcomes into the current decision-making
strategy, e.g., insula, hippocampus, and amygdala. Further, children who were more risk-
averse showed increased activation during decision-making in ventromedial prefrontal
cortex and ventral striatum. Our ﬁndings indicate that the emergence of adult levels of
risk aversion co-occurs with the recruitment of regions supporting decision-making under
risk, including the integration of prior outcomes into current decision-making behavior.This
pattern of results suggests that individual differences in the development of risk aversion
may reﬂect differences in the maturation of these neural processes.
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INTRODUCTION
Behavioral data suggest both commonalities and differences in
decision-makingbetweenadultsandchildren.Acrossthefewstud-
ies that have directly compared young children and adults in
decision-making under risk, children tend to be less risk-averse
than adults (Harbaugh et al.,2002; Levin et al.,2007a; Rakow and
Rahim, 2010; Paulsen et al., 2011). These developmental changes
could reﬂect heightened focus on reward or reduced sensitivity to
prospective loss, each of which may have distinct neurobiological
underpinnings.
A series of recent studies have identiﬁed brain systems that
contribute to decision-making under risk in adults (reviewed in
PlattandHuettel,2008;RushworthandBehrens,2008).Weusethe
term decision-making to refer to value- or goal-based decisions,
in contrast to perceptual decision-making. Core regions for pro-
cessingthebasiccomponentsof ariskydecision–expectedreward
values, the probability of outcomes, reward variance, and affec-
tive consequences – include orbitofrontal cortex (OFC),posterior
parietal cortex (PPC), ventral striatum (vSTR), anterior insula,
and amygdala (Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Krawczyk, 2002; Hsu
et al., 2005; Huettel et al., 2006; Wallis, 2007; Yang and Shadlen,
2007). The integration of this information into response plans
appears to rely upon dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), PPC,
andventromedialprefrontalcortex(vmPFC;Krawczyk,2002;Wal-
lis, 2007). In risk contexts, this integration requires that sensory
information be decomposed into the basic components of a risky
decision (e.g., value, probability, variance) and brought to bear
onthecomparisonof alternatives(vmPFC),followedbyanaction
(dlPFC)thatappropriatestheselectedalternative(seeRangeletal.,
2008, for a discussion of the components of decision-making).
Structures known to contribute to memory encoding and mem-
ory retrieval, like the hippocampus (Maratos et al., 2001), are
alsoimplicatedindecision-making,astheyprovideorganismsthe
ability to integrate their experiences with prior decision contexts,
actions, and outcomes (Platt, 2002; Shohamy and Adcock, 2010),
and are important in ﬂexibly learning cue–outcome relationships
(Shohamy et al., 2009).
Notably, regions of prefrontal cortex undergo marked struc-
tural changes from childhood to adulthood. For example, gray
and white matter density in PFC do not reach adult levels until
after adolescence (Giedd et al., 1999). Hippocampus (HC) and
amygdala(Amy)volumealsoincreasewithage,achievingapprox-
imate adult size between 12 and 15years of age (Østby et al.,
2009). Thus, it is plausible that differences in decision-making
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between younger and older adults have roots in neural develop-
ment.
Behavioral studies on the development of decision-making
under risk have identiﬁed both linear and curvilinear trajecto-
ries in risk taking. Declines in risk taking between childhood and
adulthood have often been found in tasks that present a choice
betweenasurebetandagamble,inparticularforgains(Harbaugh
et al.,2002; Levin and Hart,2003; Levin et al.,2007a;Weller et al.,
2010; Paulsen et al., 2011). Adolescents show a relative increase in
risk-takingcomparedtochildrenandadultswhentestedinslightly
more complicated gambling tasks with an emotional component
(Figner et al., 2009; Burnett et al., 2010). Still, other studies have
found age-related differences only under speciﬁc conditions. For
example, van Leijenhorst et al. (2010a) did not ﬁnd behavioral
differences in choices between a gamble that had a 0.66 probabil-
ity of returning 1 Euro and gambles that had a 0.33 probability
of returning 4, 5, or 8 Euros across a large age span of 8–26years
(see also van Leijenhorst et al.,2008). In contrast,they found that
young participants were more likely to choose a gamble with a
0.33 probability of winning only 2 Euros than a gamble with a
0.66 probability of winning 1 Euro. Although overall declines in
risk-taking with age were found by Paulsen et al. (2011), there
were no age-related differences in preference between sure bets
and gambles with low coefﬁcients of variation.
Two classes of hypothesis have been proffered to account for
children’s increased risk-taking compared to adults. The ﬁrst class
speculates that young children may be less able to incorporate
prior outcomes, in particular negative ones (Van Duijvenvoorde
et al., 2008), into choice evaluation, which could also be viewed
as a reduced sensitivity to prospective loss. For example, young
children typically perform poorly on the Iowa Gambling Task
(IGT; Bechara et al., 1994; Garon and Moore, 2004; Kerr and
Zelazo,2004),but do better on the IGT (Garon and Moore,2007)
and other gambling tasks (Brainerd, 1981) when the memory
burden of the task is simpliﬁed or reminders of previous out-
comes are provided. These observations suggest that in addition
togeneraldecision-makingcircuitry,theneuralcircuitrysupport-
ing the learning or integration of outcome history into current
decision-making processes may mature with age.
A second class of hypotheses, drawn primarily from studies
focusing on adolescents, centers on the idea that greater risk-
taking may be driven by greater neural sensitivity to reward,
coupled with an immature neural system supporting executive
control “stop” processes (Galvan et al., 2006; Casey et al., 2008a).
Although this idea is gaining increased acceptance for explaining
adolescents’ tendency to exhibit greater real-world risky behav-
iors than younger children and adults, it may also be extended to
the decline of risk-taking behavior in gambling tasks that occurs
with age (Harbaugh et al., 2002; Levin et al., 2007a; Rakow and
Rahim, 2010; Paulsen et al., 2011). Prior studies have indeed
found curvilinear activations in the striatum that peaked in ado-
lescents compared to children and adults during the anticipation
and receipt of reward (Galvan et al., 2006; van Leijenhorst et al.,
2010a),though other studies have found both greater (Ernst et al.,
2005) and lesser (Bjork et al., 2004) striatal activation in ado-
lescents than young adults during decision-making and reward
anticipation. Results have also been mixed with respect to regions
associated with cognitive control, ﬁnding decreases in OFC acti-
vation with age (Galvan et al., 2006), increases in OFC activation
withage(Esheletal.,2007),apeakinadolescence(vanLeijenhorst
et al.,2010a),or no signiﬁcant change at all (van Leijenhorst et al.,
2006). The apparent inconsistencies of these ﬁndings have been
notably attributed to differences in the age groups studied and
the variety of tasks implemented, most of which have focused on
reward processing rather than on the process of decision-making
(Galvan,2010). Here we focus on the decision-making process.
To address how the neural bases of decision-making under risk
might change over development and whether individual differ-
ences in patterns of brain activity would predict risk preferences
during decision-making, we used event-related functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) in a risky decision-making task
with 5- to 8-year-old children, 14- to 15-year-old adolescents,
and young adults. An important aspect of our task was that it
avoided the highly symbolic components of most gambling tasks
used with adults and instead allowed children to rely on their
approximate number system, which does not depend on formal
education (Barth et al., 2008). The age-appropriateness of this
task was demonstrated in a previous study (Paulsen et al., 2011).
With regard to the ﬁrst class of hypotheses, we would predict a
monotonic increase in the activation of decision-making regions
(OFC,dlPFC,vSTR,HC,Amy,PPC)withageduringthedecision-
making phase of our task. The second class of hypotheses focuses
on a subset of regions involved in decision-making and similarly
predicts a monotonic increase in OFC activation with age during
decision-making. In contrast, the second class of hypotheses pre-
dictsanoveralldeclineinreward-relatedvSTRactivationwithage,
with a rise in vSTR activation during adolescence.
Ourﬁndingsfavortheﬁrstclassofhypotheses,namelythatage-
related differences in risk-taking reﬂect the maturation of neural
systems supporting decision-making and outcome evaluation.
First, while some of the circuitry involved with risky decision-
making was found to be online at an early age, several regions
of prefrontal cortex were not fully engaged in children. Similarly,
regionsassociatedwithcontextualmemoryandtheincorporation
ofaversiveoutcomesintothedecision-makingprocessshowedless
activation in children than in adults and adolescents. Second, we
failedtoﬁndsigniﬁcantevidenceof increasedrewardsensitivityin
adolescents or children when compared to adults. In fact,children
whoshowedadult-likeriskaversionshowedgreateractivationdur-
ing the decision period for Risky Bets compared to Sure Bets in
the vmPFC and striatum than children who were less risk-averse,
consistent with the idea that the development of risk aversion co-
occurs with the recruitment of regions supporting the integration
of prior outcomes into current decision-making contexts.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS AND TASK
Thirty-four children, 18 adolescents, and 17 adults, who were
right-handed with normal or corrected to normal vision and no
historyofneurologicaldisorderswererecruitedandscanned.Data
from 17 child participants were excluded for one of three reasons:
10 for head motion exceeding a criterion of 2mm in any direction
(see Imaging Data Analysis); four due to poor accuracy (choosing
thelargervalueonSureBettrialslessthan65%)orlackofresponse
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variation; and three for failing to complete the scanning session.
Datafromoneadolescentwasexcludedforexcessiveheadmotion,
and data from one adult was excluded for lack of response vari-
ation. The remaining 17 children (8 Female) ranged in age from
5.9 to 8.0years (M =6.9years), 17 adolescents (8 Female) ranged
in age from 14.2 to 15.9years (M =14.8years), and 16 adults (6
Female) ranged in age from 18.5 to 35.5years (M =23.7years).
DukeIRB-approvedconsentformsandconﬁdentialityagreements
were obtained from adult participants,parents,or legal guardians,
and assent forms were collected from minor participants. Partici-
pantsweregivenmotionandtasktraininginamockscanner,after
which children were allowed to investigate the selection of prizes
they could choose from, prior to the actual task and scanning.
Participants were reminded that their goal was to collect as
many coins as possible. Children were told that their coins could
betradedforoneofthetoyprizestheyhadpreviouslyseenwhereas
adolescents and adults would exchange the coins earned for a gift
card worth up to $25. On each trial, participants were presented
with a choice between either two certain options (24 Sure Bet
trials), or between a certain and a gamble option (48 Risk trials;
Figure 1). Participants were ﬁrst introduced to the certain option
through Sure Bet trials during training, with the explanation that
“whichever big box you choose is the one you’re going to get.”
Risk trials were then introduced with the explanation that if they
choose the two smaller boxes,“you never know which one you’re
going to get; it could be the box with more coins or it could be the
box with less coins.” The gamble options consisted of two possi-
ble outcomes with equal probability and an expected value (EV)
equivalent to the certain alternative. Two levels of EV (two and
four coins) and two levels of risk were used. Risk was deﬁned by
the coefﬁcient of variation (CV) of the gamble options (0.71 and
1.41).Wechosetousecoefﬁcientofvariationbecausethismeasure
of riskisdimensionless,allowingcomparisontootherstudiesthat
may use different units of value, and because it has been shown
to be a good predictor of decision-making behavior under risk
across species (Shaﬁr, 2000; Weber et al., 2004). Thus, four types
FIGURE 1 | Experimental design. Each trial consisted of a decision (blue
frame), choice (salmon frame), conﬁrmation (red frame), delay (no frame),
and outcome (yellow frame) period.Trial types were psuedorandomized and
presented over three 8-min runs. Variable timing for the delay and intertrial
intervals were implemented to dissociate the temporal contingency
between adjacent events. RT, response time.
of gamble trials (12 each) were presented: small EV/low risk (1 or
3, vs 2), small EV/high risk (0 or 4 vs 2), large EV/low risk (2 or
6 vs 4), large EV/high risk (0 or 8 vs 4). The certain outcomes for
the Sure Bet trials were drawn from the sets of values used in each
of the four gamble trial types (e.g.,1 vs 2,1 vs 3,2 vs 3,etc.). Risky
Bet and Sure Bet trials were presented within blue frames for 4s
beforetheframeschangedcolor,atwhichtimerightandleftarrows
appeared beside the choice alternatives indicating the associated
responsehand,andarecordingof afemalevoicesaying“pickone”
wasplayed.Choicesweremadewithabuttonpresswiththeleftor
righthand,afterwhichtheframeof theselectedalternativeturned
red and was displayed for 1s followed by a variable 1–8s blank-
screen delay period. After the variable delay period the outcome
waspresentedfor2-saccompaniedbyaplaybackof afemalevoice
saying “you get” and, if coins were received, a short (0.15–1.2s)
playback of coin sounds. Intertrial intervals (ITI) ranged from 1
to 8s. The 12 trial types were pseudorandomly distributed and
presented in an even distribution across three runs of 24 trials
each. Each run concluded with an image of the toy prizes and the
cumulative coin winnings.
IMAGING
ImagingdatawerecollectedwithaGEExcite3Tscannerequipped
with a 40mT/m gradient system and an eight-channel head coil.
T2
∗-weighted functional images were acquired in 34 interleaved
slices using the GE standard EPI sequence (TR=2s,TE=30ms,
FOV=25.6cm, ﬂip angle=60˚, voxel size=4mm 3). Functional
data from the ﬁrst three (child) participants were acquired using a
SENSE spiral in/out sequence with the same parameters as the
EPI sequence with the hope of increased sensitivity to activa-
tion in anterior regions near air/tissue interface (Law and Glover,
2009). EPI was used with all subsequent participants because we
found the cost in signal-to-noise ratio by using a spiral in/out
sequence to be too high in our child participants. Analyses run
using only data from the 47 participants collected with EPI
sequence conﬁrmed only minor differences in activation com-
paredtothen =50sample,e.g.,slightshiftsinpeakvoxellocation
and only a few regions that did not surpass cluster correction;
notably these were regions unexpected to be affected by a spi-
ral in/out sequence. Uncorrected patterns of activation remained
the same. The differences between these analyses did not change
our main conclusions. Each 8-min run provided the acquisition
for 240 functional volumes, including four discarded acquisi-
tions at the beginning of each run. High-resolution T1-weighted
anatomicalimageswerealsoacquiredusingafastspoiledgradient-
recalled sequence (TR=7.31s,TE=2.98ms,FOV=25.6cm,ﬂip
angle=25˚, voxel size=1mm×1mm×2mm).
BEHAVIORAL DATA ANALYSIS
Response time (RT) and selection data were collected for every
trial, but only data from runs that were included in the imag-
ing analysis were analyzed for behavioral measures. Risk aversion
scoresforeachindividualandtrialtypewerecalculatedasthepro-
portion of gamble trials for which the certain option was selected.
AccuracyacrossparticipantsonSureBettrials(choosingthelarger
amount) was greater than 93%. Risk aversion scores and median
RT from each trial type were submitted to repeated-measures
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2012 | Volume 5 | Article 178 | 3Paulsen et al. Risk development
ANOVA (RM-ANOVA) with two levels of Magnitude (Small,
Large) and two levels of Risk (Low, High).
IMAGING DATA ANALYSIS
Functional imaging data were preprocessed and analyzed using
FSL 4.1.4 (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Preprocessing steps
included motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson et al.,
2002), slice scan time correction, voxel intensity normalization,
high-pass temporal ﬁltering to remove low frequency artifacts,
and trimming volumes beyond 6s after the end of the ﬁnal event
for each run. Because GE Signa EPI sequence automatically passes
images through a Fermi ﬁlter with an effective spatial smooth-
ing kernel of approximately 4.8mm3, EPI and SENSE images
were smoothed using different Gaussian kernel full width half
maximums of 8 and 9.4mm smoothing kernels,respectively,dur-
ing preprocessing to obtain an effective spatial smoothing of
approximately 9.4mm3 for both acquisition sequences.
Datafromrunswithmorethanﬁvevolumescontainingrelative
movement of greater than 2mm in any direction were excluded
from subject-level analyses. Because previous work has demon-
strated that structural differences between children’s and adult’s
brains are negligible following sufﬁcient smoothing (Burgund
et al., 2002; Kang et al., 2003), all images were normalized to the
sametemplate(MontrealNeurologicalInstituteTemplate)asdone
in previous studies with children and adolescents (e.g., Cantlon
et al.,2006; Galvan et al.,2006; Eshel et al.,2007).
Whole-brain voxel-based statistical analyses were performed
within the framework of the general linear model (GLM). Our
model included regressors that were deﬁned for the decision
period of ﬁve trial types (Sure Bet trials and each of the four
EV by risk level gamble types) and the outcome period (certain
outcomes, gamble wins, gamble losses). Nuisance regressors were
also included to account for physiological variance (time course
of intensity for voxels situated in the right ventricle), motion-
related variance (motion correction vectors), and variance due to
motorresponse(rightandlefthandresponses).Withtheexception
of ventricle and motion-related regressors, each of the regres-
sor events was convolved with a double-gamma hemodynamic
response (HDR) function and included the temporal derivative to
accountfordifferencesintheHDRbetweenchildren.Thedecision
period was modeled with duration of 4s and the outcome period
was modeled with a duration of 2s.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging data from children
have been shown to contain more variance than fMRI data from
adults (Thomason et al., 2005), as was the case with our data.
Therefore,weusedamixed-effectsapproachthatdoesnotassume
homogeneity of variance, but rather estimates and accounts for
differences in within-group variance. FSL’s cluster correction
for multiple comparisons (Gaussian-random ﬁeld theory based)
included a cluster threshold set to a height of z>2.3 to identify a
contiguous voxel cluster, and cluster probability set to p<0.05
against which to compare the cluster’s estimated signiﬁcance,
whole-brain corrected (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl).Addition-
ally,riskaversionscoresweremeanadjustedbyagegroupandused
as a covariate in a parallel analysis.
We performed three primary analyses to examine age- and
risk-related activations during decision-making. In all three, we
restricted ourselves to activations in the Risk trial>Sure Bet trial.
Although this contrast cannot dissociate certain aspects of the
decision-making process, e.g., the computation of EV or risk,
it allows us to isolate activation involved with decision-making
under risk by controlling for basic numerical processing and
mental comparison. Our ﬁrst whole-brain analysis looked for
age-related increases or decreases in activation using linear con-
trast weighting by age group, and for searched peaks or troughs
in activation using quadratic weighting by age group. A second
whole-brain test examined relationship between behavior and
brainactivationbyusingourbehavioralmeasureofriskaversionas
a covariate. This measure was mean corrected by age group before
submitting it to the GLM so that differences in activation due to
risk aversion would not be confounded by the general differences
in risk aversion due to age.
Region of interest (ROI) analyses were also performed. These
analyses were less restrictive than the whole-brain analysis in that
ourROIswereselectedonthebasisof signiﬁcantactivationinany
oneagegroup,pairof agegroups,orallagegroupstogether,rather
than an a priori pattern of activation. However, we also restricted
our ROIs by anatomical deﬁnitions. This process can be thought
of as an omnibus test for activation with follow-up tests to iden-
tify the particular patterns of activation within an anatomically
deﬁned space (see below). Thus, the procedure that we used for
ROIselectionincorporatedananatomicalconstraintandusedsta-
tistics that (a) were unbiased with respect to our hypotheses and
(b) answered a more general question than the statistics that were
used in the ROI analysis.
Region of interests deﬁned in the following manner. First, the
Risky>Sure contrasts for each age group were submitted to an
F-test within FSL to identify activations with parameter estimates
signiﬁcantlydifferentfromzero.ThisresultedinanANOVAimage
of active regions due to signiﬁcant activation in at least one age
group. Possible approaches to proceeding from this point could
have been to analyze the BOLD signal change of a peak voxel or
a region surrounding a peak voxel in an area of activation, or the
signal change in the whole of an activated region itself. However,
these approaches have the potential to miss anatomical regions if
only one peak is used in an activation that spans several regions,
and may conﬂate different anatomical regions if the whole of a
broad activation itself is used. Examination of theANOVA results
showed contiguous activation between a priori regions of inter-
est with distinct anatomical boundaries, i.e., between insula and
striatum and between occipital and posterior parietal cortices. So
to identify the location of potentially different peaks within these
regions, we incrementally raised the z-statistic threshold of the
cluster-corrected image to the minimum at which the insula was
separated from striatum (z =3.3), allowing us to identify peaks
in these regions. Over posterior sites, a large area of activation
encompassing occipital, cuneus, and parietal cortices was decom-
posed at a slightly higher threshold (z =4). The resulting peaks
are listed in Table 3.
We next introduced anatomical constraints by masking each
area of activation by the Harvard–Oxford anatomical region
withinwhichtheANOVAclusterpeakswerelocated(Figures3B,E
insets).Forexample,aclusterof activationwithapeakvoxelinthe
left insula could partially extend into OFC,but only the activation
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contained within the Harvard–Oxford atlas for left insula would
remain as the left insula ROI. We ran two step-wise regressions
with each ROI using mean percent signal change within the entire
ROI,in each participant,in the Risky>Sure contrast: one to look
for risk-related activations within and between groups (in order:
group, risk aversion, group×risk aversion interaction), and one
to identify age-related activation (in order: age, age2) using an
adjusted alpha of p<0.0017 (0.05/28).
RESULTS
DECISION-MAKING BEHAVIOR
Children,adolescents,andadultsmadedecisionsaboutprobabilis-
tic and certain rewards, which were virtual tokens that could be
tradedfortoysorgiftcardvalueattheendof thesession(Figure1;
Paulsenetal.,2011).OnSureBet trials,participantschosebetween
two certain options that differed in value,while on Risky Bet trials
participantschosebetweencertainanduncertainoptionswiththe
same EV. On Risky Bet trials, the reward magnitude was either
small (EV=2) or large (EV=4),and the risk level,deﬁned by the
coefﬁcient of variation (CV) in reward amount,was low (0.71) or
high(1.41).Riskaversionwasoperationallydeﬁnedasthepropor-
tion of Risky Bet trials in which a participant selected the certain
option.
Overall, participants accurately selected the larger reward on
greater than 97% of Sure Bet trials. A RM-ANOVA on Risky
Bet trials with reward magnitude and risk level as within-subject
factorsandagegroupasabetween-subjectfactorrevealedasignif-
icant main effect of reward magnitude [F(1,47)=21.8, p=3e-5]
indicating that participants gambled more often with larger EVs
(M=72%) than with smaller EVs (M =56%; Table 1). There
was also a main effect of risk level [F(1,47)=21.9, p=2e-10]
indicating that participants selected the gamble more often on
low risk (M =73%) than on high-risk (M =56%) trials. While
there were no interactions between age group and reward mag-
nitude (p =0.368) or risk level (p =0.257), risk aversion was
differentbetweengroups[F(2,47)=8.35,p<0.008].Importantly,
independent-sample t-tests between groups showed that children
selectedthegamblemoreoften(79%)thanbothadolescents(57%;
p =0.001)andadults(56%;p =0.001).Adolescentsandadultsdid
not differ in risk aversion, as deﬁned here (p>0.80).
AnalysisofmedianRTdatadidnotreturnanysigniﬁcantresults
(reward magnitude×risk×group: p =0.232; all other p>0.33),
although a marginal interaction between risk level and reward
magnitude was found (p =0.099). This interaction suggests that
participants took longer to respond to high risk than low risk on
Table 1 | Behavioral data: probability of selecting a gamble over a sure
bet (RT in seconds).
Group Risk level Small EV Large EV
Child Low 0.76 (1.485) 0.90 (1.553)
High 0.66 (1.670) 0.83 (1.351)
Adolescent Low 0.57 (0.776) 0.78 (0.890)
High 0.37 (0.794) 0.58 (0.841)
Adult Low 0.63 (0.594) 0.71 (0.616)
High 0.40 (0.605) 0.51 (0.606)
small magnitude trials, and longer to low risk than high risk on
large magnitude trials (Table 1). However, it should be consid-
eredthatallparticipantsexperienceda4-sdelaybetweenstimulus
presentation and the opportunity to respond, confounding RT
data as a measure of decision-making duration. A main effect of
group was also found, showing the typical reduction in RT with
age (p =2e-8).
CHANGES IN RISK-RELATED NETWORK ACTIVITY WITH AGE
To control for the contributions of numerical processing unre-
lated to risk, we examined within-participant contrasts between
the Risky Bet trials and the Sure Bet trials (risky>sure) during
the decision period (Figure 1). Whole-brain analyses included
tests for two developmental trajectories in the activation of brain
regions involved with risky decision-making, as well as an F-test
for group activations that would later form the basis of our ROI
approach. First, we report that the only regions showing signiﬁ-
cant cluster-corrected activation in all age groups was in posterior
parietal and occipital cortex (see below for additional details).
Our ﬁrst test of development in decision-making used linear con-
trasts to identify regions of activation that increased or decreased
from childhood to adulthood. This contrast revealed increasing
activation with age during decision-making under risk in several
areas of prefrontal and parietal cortex,as well as sub-cortical areas
(Table 2), but did not show any regions decreasing in activation
with age. Frontal regions that showed increasing activation with
ageincludedtheanteriorinsula,vmPFC,anteriorcingulate(ACC),
frontalpole,OFC,amygdala(Amy),andhippocampus(HC);sub-
cortical age-related increases in activations included the caudate,
putamen, and thalamus (Figure 2). Over posterior regions, lin-
early increasing activation was found in bilateral superior parietal
cortex,occipitalcortex,andprecuneusduringthedecisionperiod.
We tested for robustness to group classiﬁcation by regressing sig-
nal change at peak voxels for the regions identiﬁed in the linear
contrast (Table 2) on age. With the exception of three foci in
superior frontal gyrus, superior occipital gyrus, and dlPFC, all
regression coefﬁcients were signiﬁcant at p<0.05. To be sure that
these increases in activation were not a result of differences in the
contrast condition, we checked for decreasing activation with age
in the Sure Bet condition, which conﬁrmed that there were no
regions signiﬁcantly more active in children than adults.
We also tested for changes in the neural response to risk that
were unique to adolescents using quadratic contrasts that would
identify peaks or troughs of activation in the adolescent group for
risky>sure,butdidnotﬁndanyregionsshowingsuchpatternsof
activation in the cluster-corrected images. However, examination
of the uncorrected images did reveal small clusters of activation
peaking in adolescents in the caudate, hippocampus, and ante-
rior cingulate gyrus, among several other regions (Table A1 in
Appendix).
Inordertoconﬁrmthepreviousresultsandtoidentifydevelop-
mental effects in any regions of the brain involved with decision-
making under risk that may have been missed by the whole-brain
analysis, we also took a ROI approach. ROIs were identiﬁed using
an F-test revealing cluster-corrected activations that were sig-
niﬁcantly different during Risky Bet trials than Sure Bet trials
on average across groups; signiﬁcance could be due to a large
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Table 2 |Whole-brain analysis linear effect of age group during decision-making.
Number Region Size (vox) z_vala xb yb zb
1 R. Precuneus 3014 4.92 6 −64 60
2 R. Occipital 2144 4.53 8 −84 −4
3 R. Insula 635 4.36 38 16 −10
4 L. Anterior cingulate 598 3.94 −44 4 −2
5 L. Inferior parietal 558 4.26 −40 −52 50
6 L. Insula 325 3.99 −30 20 −10
7 R. Caudate 203 3.9 18 0 12
8 R. Middle frontal gyrus 171 3.48 40 58 −6
9 R. HC 154 3.94 16 −38 2
10 L. Putamen 111 3.43 −20 8 −6
11 L. Hippocamus 98 3.47 −26 −38 −2
12 L. Caudate tail 90 3.41 −18 −22 18
13 R. Superior frontal gyrus, frontal pole 44 3.38 28 58 20
14 R. Superior occipital gyrus 36 3.45 36 −82 34
15 R.Thalamus 24 3.19 20 −18 8
16 L. Orbital frontal cortex 23 3.23 −26 10 −24
17 L. Caudate body 19 3.12 −16 −21 2
18 R. Middle occipital gyrus 17 3.15 44 −80 18
19 R. Orbital frontal cortex 14 3.17 34 40 −8
20 R. Orbital frontal cortex 11 3.09 44 52 −22
az-Statistic values of thresholded (z>2.95) cluster-corrected image at x, y, z.
bCoordinates in MNI space.
change in one group or a small but consistent change across all
groups.ForeachROI,werantwostep-wiseregressionstolookfor
risk-related activations within and between groups (group, risk
aversion, group×risk aversion interaction) and to look for age-
relatedactivation(age,age2).Aslineareffectsofagecouldbedueto
differences between the two younger groups and the oldest group,
between the youngest group and the two older groups,or between
eachof thegroupspairwise,wefurtherperformedposthoc t-tests.
The F-test analysis yielded ROIs in portions of PFC, OFC,
insula, cingulate, PPC, and striatum (Figures 3B,E insets). These
ROIs matched a subset of regions with overlapping activation
between adolescents and adults that were found in anterior cin-
gulate, dorsal striatum, insula, PPC, and occipital regions. Areas
of activation in children overlapped with the areas activated in
both adults and adolescents in PPC and occipital cortex, as men-
tionedabove,withsub-thresholdactivationsinanteriorcingulate.
These ROIs were similar to those identiﬁed in the linear contrast
in whole-brain analysis using age group as a factor as described
above.
In tests of each ROI between age groups, our results fell into
two classes: differences between children and adolescents/adults,
and linear changes across age groups for risky>sure. We found
no risk-related ROI that showed evidence of peak activation dur-
ing adolescence. Signiﬁcant linear trends were followed by t-tests,
with correction in degrees of freedom for unequal variance when
appropriate, between each group showing group differences in
the vmPFC (Figures 3A,B), cuneus, and middle temporal gyrus
between children and adults, and children and adolescents (all
p<0.001), but not adults and adolescents (all p>0.45). Thus,
although a signiﬁcant linear trend of age was found in vmPFC
in the whole-brain analysis, this effect appears to be largely
due to the difference in BOLD signal change between children
and adolescents with little or no change from adolescence to
adulthood.
Linear effects of age were also found in right and left insula
(Figures 3D–F). In the right insula, t-tests revealed signiﬁcant
differences between children and adults (p =0.009) and between
adolescentsandadults(p =0.023),whiledifferencesbetweenchil-
dren and adolescents were marginal (p =0.082). In the left insula,
differences between children and adults were also signiﬁcant
(p =0.009), whereas differences between children and adoles-
cents (p =0.057) and between adolescents and adults (p =0.119)
approachedsigniﬁcancedemonstratingatrendsimilartotheright
insula. A separate cluster within the left posterior insula showed a
signiﬁcantinteractionbetweenriskaversionandagegroup:activa-
tioninthisROIduringthedecisionperiodforRiskyBetcompared
to Sure Bet trials was negatively correlated with risk aversion in
children,butnotinadolescentsoradults(FigureA1inAppendix).
Overall,we found strong evidence of child-speciﬁc risk-activation
deﬁcits in the vmPFC,and linear developmental effects across age
groups in the insula.
MORE ADULT-LIKE RISK AVERSION IN CHILDREN CORRELATES WITH
GREATER vmPFC ACTIVATION DURING RISKY DECISION-MAKING
Developmental changes in the neural bases supporting risk and
decision-related processing may or may not contribute to spe-
ciﬁc differences in behavior across age groups. To clarify the
links between brain activations and risk aversive choices, we
regressed our index of risk aversion against whole-brain data
within each age group. We found different networks of brain
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T
a
b
l
e
3
|
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
s
o
f
a
c
t
i
v
a
t
i
o
n
f
r
o
m
g
r
o
u
p
A
N
O
V
A
a
n
d
R
O
I
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
-
m
a
k
i
n
g
.
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
R
e
g
i
o
n
S
i
z
e
(
v
o
x
)
z
_
v
a
l
a
x
b
y
b
z
b
G
r
o
u
p
F
(
p
)
R
i
s
k
F
-
c
h
a
n
g
e
(
p
)
R
i
s
k
*
g
r
o
u
p
i
n
t
x
n
F
-
c
h
a
n
g
e
(
p
)
A
g
e
F
(
p
)
A
g
e
2
F
-
c
h
a
n
g
e
(
p
)
3
I
n
f
e
r
i
o
r
p
a
r
i
e
t
a
l
l
o
b
u
l
e
1
2
7
8
5
.
0
6
5
8
−
2
8
3
6
1
.
2
4
(
0
.
2
9
9
)
0
.
0
5
(
0
.
8
1
7
)
0
.
4
4
(
0
.
6
4
7
)
0
.
9
5
(
0
.
3
3
6
)
0
.
6
5
(
0
.
4
2
6
)
4
C
i
n
g
u
l
a
t
e
g
y
r
u
s
1
0
3
1
5
.
1
8
4
3
2
3
0
0
.
9
8
(
0
.
3
8
4
)
0
.
4
6
(
0
.
5
)
0
.
0
4
(
0
.
9
6
2
)
2
.
0
1
(
0
.
1
6
3
)
0
.
0
5
(
0
.
8
1
7
)
5
I
n
f
e
r
i
o
r
p
a
r
i
e
t
a
l
l
o
b
u
l
e
9
8
5
4
.
8
5
−
5
8
−
3
2
2
8
4
.
9
9
(
0
.
0
1
1
)
0
.
2
5
(
0
.
6
2
)
0
.
7
8
(
0
.
4
6
5
)
5
.
0
7
(
0
.
0
2
9
)
1
.
8
1
(
0
.
1
8
6
)
6
M
e
d
i
a
l
f
r
o
n
t
a
l
g
y
r
u
s
8
0
4
4
.
1
7
0
4
4
−
1
8
1
4
.
7
2
(
<
0
.
0
0
1
)
6
.
7
9
(
0
.
0
1
3
)
4
.
7
7
(
0
.
0
1
4
)
1
5
.
4
3
(
<
0
.
0
0
1
)
6
.
4
6
(
0
.
0
1
5
)
7
M
i
d
d
l
e
f
r
o
n
t
a
l
g
y
r
u
s
4
4
0
4
.
4
8
4
6
3
8
2
4
0
.
3
5
(
0
.
7
0
9
)
2
.
7
5
(
0
.
1
0
5
)
0
.
8
3
(
0
.
4
4
3
)
0
.
5
6
(
0
.
4
5
8
)
0
.
5
4
(
0
.
4
6
5
)
8
P
o
s
t
e
r
i
o
r
c
i
n
g
u
l
a
t
e
3
3
2
4
.
4
2
−
1
0
−
5
6
1
2
7
.
0
8
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
0
.
0
4
(
0
.
8
3
4
)
0
.
2
2
(
0
.
8
0
5
)
1
0
.
9
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
2
.
6
3
(
0
.
1
1
2
)
9
I
n
s
u
l
a
3
0
0
4
.
9
3
6
1
6
−
6
5
.
5
3
(
0
.
0
0
7
)
0
.
7
9
(
0
.
3
8
)
0
(
0
.
9
9
6
)
1
2
.
0
3
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
0
.
9
2
(
0
.
3
4
2
)
1
0
C
a
u
d
a
t
e
2
4
3
4
.
3
2
1
6
6
1
0
3
.
4
4
(
0
.
0
4
1
)
0
.
2
3
(
0
.
6
3
1
)
0
.
4
8
(
0
.
6
2
)
6
.
2
7
(
0
.
0
1
6
)
1
.
0
2
(
0
.
3
1
8
)
1
1
P
a
r
a
h
i
p
p
o
-
c
a
m
p
a
l
g
y
r
u
s
1
5
6
4
.
4
3
2
2
−
3
4
6
1
.
9
2
(
0
.
1
5
8
)
0
.
0
8
(
0
.
7
7
9
)
0
.
1
9
(
0
.
8
2
9
)
1
.
7
(
0
.
1
9
9
)
0
.
7
2
(
0
.
4
0
2
)
1
2
C
u
n
e
u
s
1
5
2
4
.
0
8
1
2
−
8
0
3
0
1
3
.
9
(
<
0
.
0
0
1
)
0
.
5
9
(
0
.
4
4
7
)
1
.
5
2
(
0
.
2
3
)
1
7
.
4
(
<
0
.
0
0
1
)
6
.
7
5
(
0
.
0
1
3
)
1
3
M
i
d
d
l
e
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
g
y
r
u
s
1
4
4
3
.
9
7
−
5
0
−
7
0
2
8
0
.
1
4
(
0
.
8
7
)
0
.
8
8
(
0
.
3
5
4
)
1
.
6
(
0
.
2
1
3
)
0
.
4
6
(
0
.
5
0
2
)
0
.
0
4
(
0
.
8
3
9
)
1
4
I
n
s
u
l
a
1
3
0
4
.
1
3
−
3
4
1
6
−
1
0
5
.
4
4
(
0
.
0
0
8
)
1
.
1
6
(
0
.
2
8
7
)
0
.
3
(
0
.
7
4
1
)
1
1
.
2
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
0
.
9
2
(
0
.
3
4
3
)
1
5
P
o
s
t
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
g
y
r
u
s
7
7
3
.
5
6
2
2
−
3
2
6
2
2
.
0
9
(
0
.
1
3
6
)
0
.
2
7
(
0
.
6
0
6
)
0
.
8
4
(
0
.
4
3
9
)
2
.
8
6
(
0
.
0
9
8
)
0
.
9
8
(
0
.
3
2
7
)
1
6
P
r
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
g
y
r
u
s
7
5
3
.
9
7
4
8
−
6
5
2
1
.
5
1
(
0
.
2
3
1
)
0
.
0
7
(
0
.
7
9
8
)
0
.
0
6
(
0
.
9
4
4
)
0
.
7
(
0
.
4
0
9
)
1
.
2
2
(
0
.
2
7
5
)
1
7
I
n
s
u
l
a
7
1
3
.
7
6
4
0
−
1
2
2
6
.
7
3
(
0
.
0
0
3
)
3
.
2
6
(
0
.
0
7
8
)
2
.
3
8
(
0
.
1
0
5
)
1
0
.
3
5
(
0
.
0
0
2
)
2
.
0
8
(
0
.
1
5
6
)
1
8
I
n
s
u
l
a
6
3
3
.
7
5
−
3
6
−
1
4
2
6
.
2
7
(
0
.
0
0
4
)
6
.
5
3
(
0
.
0
1
4
)
8
.
7
4
(
0
.
0
0
1
)
8
.
7
6
(
0
.
0
0
5
)
1
.
9
2
(
0
.
1
7
3
)
1
9
P
o
s
t
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
g
y
r
u
s
5
9
3
.
7
3
8
−
4
8
7
6
0
.
2
2
(
0
.
8
0
6
)
1
.
5
9
(
0
.
2
1
4
)
0
.
6
5
(
0
.
5
2
7
)
0
.
4
(
0
.
5
2
8
)
0
.
1
8
(
0
.
6
7
8
)
2
0
M
e
d
i
a
l
f
r
o
n
t
a
l
g
y
r
u
s
4
7
3
.
6
9
−
1
0
−
8
6
4
0
.
1
2
(
0
.
8
8
4
)
1
.
1
4
(
0
.
2
9
2
)
0
.
7
9
(
0
.
4
6
2
)
0
.
2
1
(
0
.
6
4
9
)
0
.
0
5
(
0
.
8
1
7
)
2
1
P
r
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
g
y
r
u
s
3
2
3
.
6
1
3
4
−
1
6
4
6
1
.
8
2
(
0
.
1
7
4
)
0
.
0
3
(
0
.
8
6
)
1
.
0
4
(
0
.
3
6
)
2
.
2
1
(
0
.
1
4
4
)
0
.
8
8
(
0
.
3
5
4
)
2
2
P
u
t
a
m
e
n
2
3
3
.
6
2
−
2
2
1
0
−
8
4
.
7
3
(
0
.
0
1
4
)
1
.
2
3
(
0
.
2
7
4
)
0
.
7
7
(
0
.
4
6
8
)
8
.
1
(
0
.
0
0
7
)
2
.
2
4
(
0
.
1
4
1
)
2
3
O
r
b
i
t
a
l
f
r
o
n
t
a
l
c
o
r
t
e
x
1
5
3
.
5
9
3
2
4
4
−
2
2
0
.
1
6
(
0
.
8
5
6
)
0
.
5
2
(
0
.
4
7
3
)
0
.
3
1
(
0
.
7
3
4
)
0
.
1
7
(
0
.
6
8
5
)
0
.
0
4
(
0
.
8
5
)
2
4
M
i
d
d
l
e
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
g
y
r
u
s
1
2
3
.
5
3
7
0
−
4
0
4
1
9
.
1
2
(
<
0
.
0
0
1
)
1
.
8
7
(
0
.
1
7
8
)
0
.
3
1
(
0
.
7
3
8
)
2
1
.
4
9
(
<
0
.
0
0
1
)
5
.
4
9
(
0
.
0
2
4
)
P
o
s
t
e
r
i
o
r
_
0
1
P
r
e
c
u
n
e
u
s
3
7
6
3
5
.
3
2
2
4
−
7
0
5
0
2
.
9
(
0
.
0
6
6
)
0
.
4
(
0
.
5
3
2
)
0
.
1
7
(
0
.
8
4
7
)
3
.
6
3
(
0
.
0
6
3
)
0
.
9
3
(
0
.
3
4
)
P
o
s
t
e
r
i
o
r
_
0
2
M
i
d
d
l
e
o
c
c
i
p
i
t
a
l
g
y
r
u
s
3
0
7
0
5
.
3
6
3
4
−
8
4
2
0
.
2
1
(
0
.
8
1
4
)
0
(
0
.
9
4
5
)
0
.
4
7
(
0
.
6
2
7
)
0
.
4
2
(
0
.
5
2
1
)
0
.
0
5
(
0
.
8
2
7
)
P
o
s
t
e
r
i
o
r
_
0
3
I
n
f
e
r
i
o
r
o
c
c
i
p
i
t
a
l
g
y
r
u
s
2
5
7
0
5
.
7
2
−
3
0
−
9
4
−
2
1
.
8
8
(
0
.
1
6
5
)
1
.
0
4
(
0
.
3
1
3
)
0
.
2
6
(
0
.
7
7
2
)
2
.
2
9
(
0
.
1
3
7
)
0
.
4
5
(
0
.
5
0
5
)
P
o
s
t
e
r
i
o
r
_
0
4
C
i
n
g
u
l
a
t
e
g
y
r
u
s
2
1
1
4
.
9
−
1
2
−
2
6
4
0
4
.
8
5
(
0
.
0
1
2
)
0
(
0
.
9
4
7
)
0
.
2
2
(
0
.
8
0
2
)
7
.
4
5
(
0
.
0
0
9
)
0
.
8
1
(
0
.
3
7
3
)
P
o
s
t
e
r
i
o
r
_
0
5
C
i
n
g
u
l
a
t
e
g
y
r
u
s
1
4
1
4
.
7
9
1
4
−
2
4
4
2
1
.
1
8
(
0
.
3
1
7
)
0
.
0
6
(
0
.
8
0
9
)
0
.
4
6
(
0
.
6
3
5
)
0
.
9
3
(
0
.
3
3
9
)
0
.
8
2
(
0
.
3
6
9
)
P
o
s
t
e
r
i
o
r
_
0
6
P
o
s
t
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
g
y
r
u
s
2
5
4
.
2
5
−
1
6
−
3
2
6
4
0
.
4
1
(
0
.
6
6
7
)
0
.
4
1
(
0
.
5
2
7
)
0
.
4
7
(
0
.
6
2
6
)
0
.
1
9
(
0
.
6
6
2
)
0
.
4
9
(
0
.
4
8
7
)
C
l
u
s
t
e
r
s
1
a
n
d
2
(
n
o
t
s
h
o
w
n
)
w
e
r
e
s
u
b
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
i
n
t
o
p
o
s
t
e
r
i
o
r
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
s
1
−
6
b
y
r
a
i
s
i
n
g
t
h
e
z
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
t
h
r
e
s
h
o
l
d
o
f
t
h
e
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
-
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
e
d
i
m
a
g
e
.
a
z
-
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
v
a
l
u
e
s
o
f
t
h
r
e
s
h
o
l
d
e
d
(
z
>
3
.
3
f
o
r
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
s
3
–
2
4
,
z
>
4
f
o
r
p
o
s
t
e
r
i
o
r
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
s
1
–
6
)
,
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
-
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
e
d
i
m
a
g
e
a
t
x
,
y
,
z
.
b
C
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
s
i
n
M
N
I
s
p
a
c
e
.
F
-
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
n
d
p
-
v
a
l
u
e
s
f
o
r
p
a
r
a
m
e
t
e
r
s
u
s
e
d
i
n
s
t
e
p
-
w
i
s
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
a
s
p
a
r
t
o
f
R
O
I
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
.
E
m
b
o
l
d
e
n
e
d
v
a
l
u
e
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
t
h
a
t
r
e
a
c
h
e
d
a
n
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
p
<
0
.
0
0
1
7
.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2012 | Volume 5 | Article 178 | 7Paulsen et al. Risk development
FIGURE 2 | Regions associated with decision-making and context show
increased activation with age during the decision period. Several regions
comprising a decision-making network showed increased activation with age
during decision-making.This network consists of areas associated with
processing risk – superior parietal cortex (sPAR) and insula (INS) – and regions
associated with processing value – orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and striatum (STR). Additionally, brain regions often
associated with memory and context showed increased activation with age
during the decision period.These regions include: anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), associated with ﬁctive learning and conﬂict detection; frontal pole (FP),
associated with goals and strategies; amygdala (AMY), associated with
affective dimensions of previous outcomes and current stimuli; and
hippocampus (HC), associated with contextual memory. Coordinates in MNI
space.
FIGURE 3 | vmPFC showed age- and risk-related activation, while
bilateral insula showed only age-related increases in activation during
decision-making. Decision-related activation for the vmPFC ROI [(B); yellow]
was greater in adults and adolescents than it was in children (A),
demonstrating that the age-related linear trend found here was due primarily
to the difference between children and adults. Whole-brain analysis revealed
activation in children that correlated with risk aversion in ACC and vmPFC [(B);
green].The vmPFC cluster from this whole-brain analysis overlapped with the
vmPFC ROI [(B); red]. Regression slopes for each age group shown in (C)
demonstrate the unique relationship between BOLD signal change in vmPFC
and risk aversion scores found for children. Age-related linear trends of
activation were also found in right and left insula ROIs (E). In contrast to
vmPFC, these regions showed a more robust positive linear relationship to
age (D,F). Coordinates in MNI space; circles – children;
diamonds – adolescents; squares – adults; *p<0.05;˚p<0.1. Note:Though
some of the children’s data appear to be outliers, all of the children’s data
points in Figure 3 are less than 2.5 SD from the group mean of the panel, and
only two exceed 2 SD.
regionstobeassociatedwithriskpreferencesineachgroup.Inchil-
dren,risk aversion was correlated with activation in ACC,vmPFC
(Figure3C),caudateandOFCduringthedecisionperiodforRisky
Bets compared to Sure Bets (Figure 4), while in adolescents risk
aversionwascorrelatedwithactivationinmedialfrontalgyrusand
central cingulate gyrus. In contrast to previous studies (Huettel
etal.,2006),wefailedtoﬁndneuralactivationduringthedecision
period in adults that was correlated with levels of risk aversion.
ACTIVATION ASSOCIATED WITH OUTCOME EVALUATION
The activation in response to winning, or positive outcomes (the
greater of the possible gamble outcomes) and losing or negative
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FIGURE 4 |Whole-brain analyses revealed that risk aversion was
correlated with activation in caudate nucleus and OFC for children
(shown here) but not for adults or adolescents, during decision-making.
(A) Activation maps and (B) scatterplots showing the relationship between
BOLD signal and risk aversion. Coordinates in MNI space; Caud, caudate
nucleus; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex.
outcomes (the lesser of the possible gamble outcomes) were
analyzed with respect to the combined ISI and ITI baseline. Posi-
tiveoutcomesevokedasimilarpatternofactivationforadolescents
and adults across a number of regions,including superior tempo-
ralgyrus(STG),ACC,dlPFC,lateralOFC,insula,striatum,inferior
parietal cortex, inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and fusiform gyrus
(Figure A2A, Table A2 in Appendix). In children, positive out-
comes elicited activation overlapping with that of adolescents and
adultsinSTG,insula,striatum,inferiorparietal,andIFG.Withage,
increasing activation to positive outcomes was found in dlPFC,
inferior parietal, and inferior occipital regions.
Overlapping activation to unfavorable or losing outcomes was
also similar in adolescents and adults, and was found in insula,
STG, and ACC (Figure A2B, Table A3 in Appendix). Regions of
activation that overlapped for all three age groups were restricted
to STG and insula. Linear trends of age in activation to losing
outcomes were found in STG, occipital cortex, and precuneus.
DISCUSSION
Our data suggest that the development of risk aversion co-occurs
with the recruitment of a network of brain regions that support
decision-making under risk, including the integration of prior
outcomes into current decisions. Within regions of the brain
associated with decision-making under risk across age groups,
we found that the insula showed robust linear patterns of acti-
vation with age. Furthermore, the vmPFC exhibited a unique
relationship with risk aversion. While vmPFC activations were
not perfectly overlapping, there was a region of vmPFC that was
activeinadolescentsandadultsthatoverlappedwiththeactivation
correlated with risk aversion in children, interpreted as vmPFC
activation in children who made more adult-like risk-averse
choices.
A novel ﬁnding was that young children engage structures
involved with learning, affect, and memory (e.g., hippocampus,
amygdala, and vmPFC) to a lesser extent than do both adults and
adolescents when making decisions under risk. The hippocampus
is known to be active during informed decision-making and is
important for learning cue–target associations (Ernst et al., 2002;
Amso et al., 2005). Projections from HC to the midbrain sig-
nal the detection of new information, while midbrain dopamine
neurons reciprocally modulate HC activity, thought to signal
eventsof biologicalandmotivationalsalienceandgivingweightto
preservingimportantmemories(LismanandGrace,2005;Adcock
et al.,2006).Amygdala activation is often associated with the pro-
cessing of emotional content but it is also involved with learning
and representing stimulus value (Cardinal et al., 2002; Guitart-
Masip et al., 2010). In conjunction with hippocampus and amyg-
dala, vmPFC activation signals the successful learning of abstract
cue–outcome relations (Hampton et al., 2007; Kumaran et al.,
2009) as well as the subjective value of chosen options (Kable and
Glimcher,2007;Hareetal.,2010;Smithetal.,2010).Thus,ourdata
couldsuggestthatinformationfrompriordecisionsandoutcomes
maynotbeasreadilyincorporatedintochildren’sdecision-making
processes as they are in adults, with the caution that this sugges-
tion relies on reverse inference (Poldrack, 2006). However, this
hypothesis is supported by behavioral data that demonstrate an
improvement in the slow learning rates of young children in gam-
bling tasks by reducing memory load or by providing reminders
of prior outcomes (Brainerd,1981;Garon and Moore,2004,2007;
Kerr and Zelazo, 2004).
We also found a robust correlation between age and insula
activation during the decision period for Risky Bets compared
to Sure Bets that can be interpreted in several ways. Prior stud-
ies have found anterior insula activation associated with classical
conditioning of aversive stimuli and correlated with measures of
harm avoidance (Büchel et al., 1998; Paulus et al., 2003). Thus,
oneinterpretationof thesedataisthatincreasinginsulaactivation
with age merely tracks the development of a region supporting
loss aversion, if we assume that small gains are considered losses
compared to the larger alternative outcomes (Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1991) and that losses are aversive. A recent meta-analysis
has identiﬁed the anterior insula as particularly important for the
representationofriskandtheinﬂuenceofemotiononriskprocess-
ing (Mohr et al.,2010). In this case,we might consider age-related
activation of the insula to reﬂect a maturation in the processing
or perception of risk, which in our case assumes a model adopt-
ing coefﬁcient of variation as a risk index (Weber et al., 2004).
It has been suggested that the anatomical position of the insula
is ideal for combining affective and cognitive information during
decision-makingbecauseof itsconnectivitytosurroundingstruc-
tures including the amygdala and nucleus accumbens (Preuschoff
et al., 2008). Thus, another more general interpretation of our
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2012 | Volume 5 | Article 178 | 9Paulsen et al. Risk development
data could be that the age-related increase in insula activation,
as well as other regions, reﬂects the maturing connectivity of a
decision-making network. These alternative interpretations are
not necessarily exclusive. The importance of this region in risky
decision-making and development is clearly an avenue for future
research.
The association we have found between brain regions with
age-related increases in activation and the development of risk
aversion is supported by other lesion and fMRI studies. Amyg-
dala and insula patients show an increased propensity to gamble,
especially under gain conditions similar to the ones in our task
(Weller et al., 2007; Clark et al., 2008; Talmi et al., 2010). OFC
and ACC activation during decision-making has been associated
with greater risk aversion in adults compared to adolescents (Gal-
van et al., 2006; Eshel et al., 2007). Activation in these regions in
our study was found to increase with age, as was risk aversion.
Interestingly, bilateral amygdala damage has been shown to alter
neural responses in the ACC, vmPFC, OFC, and insula (Hamp-
ton et al., 2007), which adds further support to the notion that
these regions develop as an interconnected network supporting
decision-making.
In contrast to (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005), we found that
increased activation in decision value regions like the vmPFC and
striatum in children was associated with a decrease in preference
for the risky option rather than an increase while activation in
these same regions increased with age. Prior studies have found
enhanced sensitivity of striatal reward processing regions in ado-
lescents, who are as a group characterized by riskier real-world
behaviorcomparedtoadultsorchildren(Caseyetal.,2008b).Such
ﬁndings offer the hypothesis that differences in striatal reward
processing contribute to differences in risk preferences (Arnett,
1992;Galvanetal.,2006;Caseyetal.,2008b;vanLeijenhorstetal.,
2010a,b). We found little evidence to support this idea. Although
aninvertedU-shapedpatternofactivationwasidentiﬁedinasmall
uncorrected cluster in the striatum, this region was more dorsal
andlateraltotheproposedrewardsensitiveregionnucleusaccum-
bens. Nevertheless, it is possible for a region to show ﬁts to linear
and curvilinear trends,but it will remain a subjective issue how to
interpret data of this sort.We interpret the current data to suggest
that there is greater evidence for a linear change in activation and
maturity in decision-making regions between 5years of age and
early adulthood than there is for a quadratic one.
It is also important to note that curvilinear activations in the
striatum have been reported in response to rewards or reward
cues rather than during decision-making (Galvan et al.,2006; van
Leijenhorst et al., 2010a). During decision-making in a gambling
task, Eshel et al. (2007) reported increasing activation with age in
OFC and ACC, and similar to the current ﬁndings, also reported
a negative correlation between risk-taking and activation in OFC
for adolescents. A decrease in the difference between activation
in high risk vs activation in low risk trials was found with age
in ACC, while an inverted U-shaped pattern was found in medial
OFC(vanLeijenhorstetal.,2010a).Adolescentstestedinadriving
simulation were found to show decreased activation in striatum
and OFC compared to adults, when peers were present (Chein
et al., 2010). Similar to the patterns of activation in the current
study, Bjork et al. (2004, 2010) have found that adults exhibit
greater activation in the striatum, insula, and amygdala, than do
adolescents in response to reward cues.
There are at least three critical aspects of task design that ren-
der direct comparisons between studies difﬁcult: the component
of the decision-making process targeted (e.g., decision-making,
cue/anticipation, and outcome), the age groups included and
excluded, and the task contrasts and/or baselines each study used
(Galvan, 2010). For example, it may be problematic to compare
our sample of children in the 5- to 8-year age range to ﬁndings
from studies that sample children in the 7- to 11-year age range
(Ernst et al.,2005; Galvan et al.,2006; van Leijenhorst et al.,2006,
2010a).Adolescentsinourstudywerenotfoundtoshowenhanced
striatalactivation,butwerealsolesspronetomakingriskychoices
than adolescents tested in some other tasks. Our ﬁndings indi-
cate that increased activation in reward processing regions during
decision-making may not necessarily predict greater engagement
in risky behavior, but instead may reﬂect partial maturation of
decision-making circuitry.
Posterior parietal activation, which has been previously found
toassociatewithriskpreference,actionselection,rewardvalue,and
probability of reward,was also found to increase linearly with age
during the decision period for Risky Bets compared to Sure Bets
(Platt and Glimcher, 1999; Huettel et al., 2006;Yang and Shadlen,
2007; Boorman et al., 2009). This region is also well known for
its role in numerical processing and attention (Piazza et al., 2004;
Cantlon et al., 2006; Huettel et al., 2006; Boorman et al., 2009).
Although we attempted to isolate the effects of risk processing
from numerical computation, it is possible that at least some of
the residual PPC activation we observed was due to the addition
of a third numerical value to be compared in Risky Bet trials com-
paredtojustthetwoinvolvedwithSureBettrials.Thus,itremains
difﬁcult to assess how much of the activation found in PPC was
due to numerical processing and how much was due to risk.
Analysis of behavioral data showed relatively less risk–taking
among older participants than among children. This differ-
ence raises questions regarding children’s incentivization or their
understanding of the task. Equating incentives across ages is often
a problem in developmental research. However, our use of toys
for children and monetary value for older participants as incen-
tives returned results keeping with other studies that used similar,
dissimilar, or no economic incentives between groups (Harbaugh
et al., 2002; Levin and Hart, 2003; Levin et al., 2007b; Rakow and
Rahim, 2010; Weller et al., 2010; Paulsen et al., 2011). Although
participants were not informed of the exact probabilities for risky
outcomes,priorworkfromourlab(Paulsenetal.,2011)hasshown
that behavior among samples from the same age groups as the
current fMRI study does not differ among age groups when risk
level (CV) is low, suggesting that the subjective probabilities of
“winning”aresimilar.Similarly,otherworkhasdemonstratedthat
probabilisticdiscountingisunaffectedbyage(Scheresetal.,2006).
In the current task,we found that behavior was modulated by risk
levelandEVacrossgroups.Together,ﬁndingssuggestthatchildren
bothwereproperlyincentivizedandthattheyunderstoodthetask.
Unexpectedly, adolescent and adult participants on average
selected gamble options on slightly more than 50% of tri-
als, demonstrating risk-seeking behavior instead of the typical
risk-averse behavior often associated with adult populations. It is
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possible that participants exhibited risk-seeking behavior because
the outcomes associated with the gambles in our task were small,
and therefore were not perceived as especially risky (Markowitz,
1952). However, the increase in risk taking for larger magnitude
over smaller magnitude gambles is inconsistent with this sug-
gestion. Other studies have found that risk preference can be
modulated by the probabilities and variance of outcomes (Weber
and Chapman,2005; Paulsen et al.,2011). Thus,it is possible that
the risk-seeking behavior we observed in adolescents and adults
was due to the particular parameters implemented in this version
of the task.
There are limitations associated with the current task design.
First, to dissociate decision-making and response selection, we
presented choice options for 4s before providing response cues.
While this procedure was used to remove an important poten-
tial confound,it limited our ability to model the decision-making
period as a function of RT, and may have increased the noise in
our sample if there was a lot of variability in the time at which
decisions were made. In this case, using a 4-s decision-making
epoch in our model would be overestimating the expected dura-
tionofbrainactivation,reducingourabilitytodetectmorerapidly
occurringdecisionprocesses,orinidentifyingsimilaritiesinbrain
activation across age groups that have dissimilar time courses.
Another potential limitation may have been our choice of a con-
trast condition. We chose to use the Sure Bet condition for our
contrasts in order to control for the numerical comparison com-
ponent of our economic decision-making task. While our Risk
trials involved three numerical components, Sure Bet trials con-
tained only two. Thus, we were unable to fully control for the
effects of numerical comparison. Another potential limitation in
our choice of the Sure Bet condition as a contrast is that effects
other than numerical comparisons may also have been reduced.
For example, the expectation of reward is clear with both a Sure
Bet and choosing the safe option (Bjork et al., 2004, 2010), and
this expectation could potentially minimize differences in BOLD
activation between Sure Bet and Risk conditions in the adult and
adolescent groups, as they chose the Safe option more often in
Risk trials than children. Finally, while the lower quantity gamble
outcomes may have appeared as losses relative to the sure bet and
larger gamble outcomes, the value manipulations made it such
that choosing a gamble would probabilistically be rewarded 75%
of the time. This makes it difﬁcult to directly compare the activa-
tion in response to outcomes in our task to studies in which losses
are actually incurred.
In summary, we found that a shared network of brain regions
was recruited when young children (5- to 8-years-old), ado-
lescents (15- to 16-years-old), and adults (18- to 35-years-old)
made decisions under risk. A number of brain regions previously
shown to be involved with decision-making under risk showed
increasing activation with age, including areas associated with
contextual memory. In addition, regions of the brain associated
with value determination such as the vmPFC were more active
in adults and adolescents than children. Thus, our data provide
more support for the hypothesis that the development of mature
risk aversion occurs through the gradual development of the
neural network that supports decision-making under risk, rather
than an imbalance between reward-related and executive control-
relatedregions.Further,childrenwitharelativelymorerisk-averse
proﬁle and thus a more adult-like pattern of responding also
showed an increased vmPFC response, suggesting that maturing
riskydecision-makingstrategiesmayreﬂectrelativematurationof
decision value systems.
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APPENDIX
FIGUREA1 | Posterior insula shows age group by risk aversion
interaction. (A) An interaction between age group and risk aversion in
posterior insula showed that (B) while activation during decision-making in
adolescents and adults did not correlate in any way with risk aversion,
activation in children decreased with greater risk aversion, in children,
activation in posterior insula decreased with greater risk aversion.
Coordinates in MNI space.
FIGUREA2 |Winning and losing outcomes elicit similar patterns of
activation in children, adolescents, and adults. (A) Activations to
winning outcomes in all age groups were found in superior temporal gyrus,
insula, striatum, inferior frontal gyrus, and inferior parietal regions. Adults
and adolescents showed additional activation in dlPFC, lateral OFC, and
ACC. (B) Relative losses elicited activation for all age groups in superior
temporal gyrus and insula, while adults and adolescents also showed
activation in anterior cingulate. Coordinates in MNI space; z >3.0.
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TableA1 | Uncorrected regions of activation from the quadratic contrast showing adolescent peaks.
Number Region Size (vox) z_vala xb yb zb
1 R. Middle occipital gyrus 200 3.7 38 −94 12
2 R. Superior parietal lobule 103 2.93 28 −50 58
3 Cerebellum 100 3.18 −16 −64 −14
4 R. Hippocampus 49 3.22 22 −38 2
5 L. Superior parietal lobule 28 2.84 −30 −48 58
6 Middle occipital gyrus 26 3.06 −34 −98 6
7 Middle occipital gyrus 23 2.73 38 −64 10
8 Medial frontal gyrus/cingulate gyrus 21 2.84 −62 8 4 2
9 Fusiform gyrus 21 3.01 28 −38 −22
10 Cerebellum 21 2.83 −26 −42 −26
11 Temporal fusiform cortex 20 2.84 −36 −28 −30
12 Inferior parietal lobule 18 2.74 56 −26 48
13 Anterior cingulate 16 2.79 −84 2 2 2
14 Middle frontal gyrus 15 2.8 −48 38 26
15 Postcentral gyrus 14 2.73 −56 −28 50
16 Cerebellum 12 2.83 −36 −48 −28
17 Caudate 9 2.6 22 24 2
18 Precentral gyrus 8 2.72 64 10 4
19 Postcentral gyrus 7 2.73 26 −38 74
20 Lateral occipital cortex 6 2.59 50 −64 6
az-Statistic values of thresholded (z>2.5), uncorrected image at x, y, z.
bCoordinates in MNI space.
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TableA2 |Activation to winning outcomes by age group.
Group Number Region Size (vox) z_vala xb yb zb
Children 1 Temporal lobe 911 4.31 50 −40 12
2 Inferior parietal lobule 653 4.22 40 −48 50
3 Insula 519 3.72 42 22 0
4 Middle frontal gyrus 392 3.81 34 56 2
5 Middle temporal gyrus 330 3.88 −64 −32 0
6 Middle frontal gyrus 180 3.82 48 18 32
7 Superior temporal gyrus 71 3.46 62 10 −2
8 Superior temporal gyrus 33 3.44 −66 −38 12
9 Superior temporal gyrus 26 3.62 −58 −44 24
10 Superior frontal gyrus 21 3.32 40 52 26
Adolescents 1 Inferior parietal lobule 1302 4.63 44 −36 56
2 Middle occipital gyrus 1177 4.87 40 −74 −8
3 Declive 980 4.6 −34 −66 −18
4 Middle temporal gyrus 944 4.37 52 −30 −4
5 Putamen 923 4.23 26 14 −2
6 Putamen 426 4.28 −28 14 −8
7 Superior frontal gyrus 222 3.48 32 46 −4
8 Cingulate gyrus 204 4.19 4 28 36
9 Sub-gyral 47 3.45 32 12 28
10 Inferior frontal gyrus 37 3.52 50 12 24
11 Middle frontal gyrus 31 3.22 44 44 20
12 Medial frontal gyrus 28 3.34 −10 40 22
13 Middle frontal gyrus 25 3.33 38 52 −20
14 Medial frontal gyrus 22 3.26 12 48 22
15 Cingulate gyrus 20 3.21 10 −26 26
16 Sub-gyral 19 3.24 28 −36 26
17 Inferior frontal gyrus 16 3.28 40 30 8
18 Superior frontal gyrus 10 3.1 −62 4 5 4
Adults 1 Superior temporal gyrus 8808 5.49 48 −32 2
2 Middle frontal gyrus 4169 5.19 42 36 24
3 Inferior parietal lobule 2065 5.36 52 −42 50
4 Cingulate gyrus 1777 4.89 4 34 28
5 Inferior occipital gyrus 1616 5.79 32 −84 0
6 Inferior occipital gyrus 1593 5.13 −28 −90 −2
7 Superior temporal gyrus 851 4.81 −66 −42 6
8 Inferior parietal lobule 637 4.86 −42 −50 46
9 Middle frontal gyrus 506 4.24 −42 14 34
10 Precuneus 171 4.75 8 −66 60
11 Cingulate gyrus 156 3.72 −4 −22 28
12 Declive 135 3.76 0 −68 −12
13 Superior temporal gyrus 100 3.94 −54 −14 −2
14 Sub-gyral (white matter) 83 3.83 −24 −38 38
15 Putamen 30 3.42 −26 −22 −2
16 Superior frontal gyrus 24 3.47 20 26 50
17 Inferior temporal gyrus 13 3.93 58 −56 −16
18 Sub-gyral 10 3.27 −24 −22 30
az-Statistic values of thresholded (z>2.3), cluster-corrected image at x, y, z.
bCoordinates in MNI space.
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TableA3 |Activation to losing outcomes by age group.
Group Number Region Size (vox) z_vala xb yb zb
Children 1 Superior temporal gyrus 1086 4.04 56 −40 12
2 Middle temporal gyrus 627 3.81 −48 −30 −6
3 Putamen 562 4.24 30 14 −8
4 Inferior parietal lobule 244 3.96 42 −48 46
5 Middle temporal gyrus 46 3.98 62 −48 −6
6 Inferior parietal lobule 38 3.27 58 −42 46
7 Fusiform gyrus 24 3.27 −38 −54 −16
8 Insula 20 3.52 42 6 12
9 Inferior frontal gyrus 14 3.37 52 24 6
Adolescents 1 Insula 1500 4.76 42 26 −4
2 Insula 1239 5.06 −40 18 −6
3 Superior temporal gyrus 1023 4.57 48 −32 4
4 Cingulate gyrus 429 3.81 −43 42 4
5 Medial frontal gyrus 108 3.39 0 58 16
6 Middle temporal gyrus 106 4.1 46 4 −36
Adults 1 Insula 15915 5.92 32 12 −12
2 Inferior parietal lobule 1274 5.13 44 −48 56
3 Superior temporal gyrus 945 4.24 −56 −14 0
4 Lingual gyrus 644 4.36 32 −80 −8
5 Cingulate gyrus 530 4.78 2 −22 32
6 Fusiform gyrus 217 3.69 −42 −72 −16
7 Supramarginal gyrus 181 4.43 −60 −52 36
8 Superior frontal gyrus 122 3.87 12 30 54
9 Cuneus 72 3.65 4 −100 6
10 Sub-gyral 62 3.58 −22 −40 32
11 Cuneus 48 3.53 −26 −20 32
12 Inferior occipital gyrus 33 3.21 −22 −98 6
13 Lingual gyrus 24 3.83 −24 −92 −4
14 Middle frontal gyrus 13 3.34 −24 44 −18
az-Statistic values of thresholded (z>2.3), cluster-corrected image at x, y, z.
bCoordinates in MNI space.
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